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When looking at the state there are many things that we take for granted today. For 
example, many people would consider services such as jails, fire service and the military as 
basic duties of government, to the point that even many libertarians agree on such roles for 
government. However, when we go back into the history of the nation state, we see that even 
these basic functions of government were being performed by subnational organizations. It is 
taken for granted by many that the government has an active role to play in regulating the 
economy, and social relations, and that these regulations can and will be enforced. Yet these 
same subnational organizations were often found subverting what was best for all of society, in 
favor of the organization’s best interests.       
In my paper I analyze how subnational organizations in the form of guilds in Germany 
and England, and Sufi religious brotherhoods in Senegal affected state consolidation and state 
power. I argue that subnational organizations used their power to prevent governments from 
taking the necessary reforms that would benefit the whole state, and that the power of these 
organizations was only broken once there was a fundamental change to the environment in 
which they operated.  
I produced case studies for the guilds of Germany and England, and Sufi religious 
brotherhoods in Senegal. From these case studies I have found that strong subnational 
organizations do weaken state consolidation and power, but I have also seen that these 
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The collapse of the Western Roman Empire created a massive power vacuum in Europe. 
Into that vacuum Feudalism developed. Feudal relationships were fundamentally about 
protection and power. At the start of the feudal system power was divided primarily between 
the nobility, clergy, and serfs.  As time progressed urban centers began to develop, and towns 
began to amass economic power that was not subject to the same level of control as that of the 
serfs. The towns also began to develop independent institutions to govern themselves. These 
institutions clashed with the larger state entities that they were a part of. A key piece of these 
urban institutions were guilds. Guilds were economic associations where the members worked 
together for the benefit of the members of their trade. Generally speaking, guilds-imposed 
entry barriers to their trade, and regulated all aspects of production, and the social lives of their 
members. This was then enforced by local governments, who in turn extracted economic rents 
from the guilds. While guilds took many forms across Europe, they all had a common purpose in 
regulating the market to there advantage, in exchange the state would require the guilds to 
preform certain activities.   
In her book The European Guilds and Economic Analysis Ogilvie points out many of these 
activities, including cash payments, giving a share of revenue, ad hoc fiscal support, giving 
regular taxes, assistance in collecting taxes, giving loans to the government, assisting in 
enforcing regulations, providing military help, and providing political support. It is important to 
note how important these activities were to states, as regular yearly taxation was not the norm 
in middle ages, and by providing consistent cash, guilds served as a massive source of relatively 
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stable liquidity. This liquidity was then used to fund wars, and to fund local politicians. Guilds 
also highly regulated the social life of the town, even to the point of clashing with their feudal 
overlords.  
Consider the following that in 1742 a man by the name of Flegel, a citizen of Hildesheim 
and a tinsmith by trade, fell in love with the wrong girl. The small towns of the German 
speaking lands were no strangers to local drama. What made the story of Flegel remarkable 
was that while this kind of local drama had the power to seriously disrupt the harmony of the 
towns’ citizens, it usually did not result in a threat of military invasion. For Flegel was not a 
stereotypical young man seeking to win the approval of the girl’s father, nor was he a spurned 
lover attempting to marry the girl against her will. No, Flegel had a much bigger problem. The 
trade guild to which he belonged, the tinsmiths, refused to recognize the marriage as 
legitimate. The reason was that the girl’s father was deemed to be illegitimate because he was 
born out of wedlock and the guild had a rule that their members must marry into a family that 
had a least four generations of irreproachable grandparents. 
 Although the girl’s father was now deemed legitimate by the territorial law of the 
Bishopric of Hildesheim (in whose territory the town was located), the local guild disagreed. The 
refusal of the guild to recognize the marriage meant that Flegel’s children would not be given 
citizenship in the town. Without citizenship they would not be able to practice a trade in the 
town or marry a citizen of the town. Flegel and the girl’s father pleaded their case, committees 
were formed, university legal scholars were called in, and still the guild refused. This had now 
become a proxy battle between the town and the state (in this case the bishopric) over who 
had the final say in town matters. In the end, Flegel did marry the girl outside of the town 
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borders. Later, the marriage was deemed legitimate by the tinsmith guild of Hildesheim, but 
only when it became clear that refusal meant a military intervention by the bishop’s troops. 
This was not a quick process as the guild’s recognition of the marriage took place sometime 
after 1747, more than five years since Flegel had become engaged.  
This winding tale helps to give us an example to the extent of which the basic functions 
of daily life in 18th century Germany were dependent on subnational organizations such as 
guilds, and the church. The stronger that these organizations where (and in some cases are) the 
weaker the state that they are in is. It is not to the credit of the strength of the Bishop of 
Hildesheim that he had to resort to a threat of military intervention in one of his own towns 
over a marital dispute. By studying how states dealt with strong subnational organizations such 
as guilds we can see that such groups disrupt state centralization, and consolidation efforts. To 
observe this, I will be looking at this history of guilds in Europe. Specially contrasting the history 
of the guilds of the German speaking lands to those of England. Then to look at the situation of 










In this paper I will argue that guilds and Sufi brotherhoods in Senegal by virtue of their 
economic and social power will result in a weaker state. That is a state the is not as able to 
enforce laws that is passes, and a state that is not able to secure absolute power but instead 
must rely on distinct subnational organizations for various forms of support. Over the long run 
the state is not able to pass the most rational laws for the whole country and instead has to 
cater to special interests. As a result of their strength these subnational organizations 
perpetuated systems that further entrenched their own power. Only when there is a 
substantial change to the fundamental conditions that brought about these systems can the 
state fully develop and establish its full authority.         
Literature Review 
As modern states developed, they faced many obstacles. The modern nation state had 
to follow a long and twisting path to develop to the level it has today. States had to battle 
decentralization and struggled to bring the various elements in the state under control. While 
some scholars argue that these organizations strengthened states by creating social capital, and 
the breeding grounds of democracy and the middle class, others argue that they inhibited the 
state; that they provided a crutch without which the state could not fully function on its own.   
Tilly in his book How War Made States and Vice Versa, (1990) makes the case that the 
formation of the modern state was driven by the need to wage war, and that both the economy 
and military had to be centralized. The old medieval system of dividing power horizontally in 
society between many groups had to end. Instead power had to be gathered and arranged 
Waldschmidt8 
 
vertically with the state at the top. Thus, the state could bring its whole economic and military 
force to bare in longer and more costly wars.  
War was not the only reason for centralization consider Scot, who in his 1998 book 
Seeing like at State makes the point that states need to get rid of local particularities in the 
economy and in terms of local laws. These were two areas that guilds were directly involved in 
regulating. For Senegal the area of law has been a point of contention as Sufi religious 
brotherhoods use there economic and political power to advocate for conservative social laws, 
and to cause widespread nonenforcement of laws that they do not approve of.    
The key issue of why guilds were such a problem for nation states is that they kept 
economic and social power anchored in the local regions and highly irregular. Every guild would 
have their own regulations and they along with the medieval town which they influenced 
fought state centralization. States needed to centralize primarily for economic reasons to 
maximize free trade inside the country and of course to collect more taxes for the larger 
permanent standing armies that modern wars required. This is why states had to take actions 
to curb the power of the towns and guilds as they had more power to resist these changes then 
the peasants bound on the land. The state was working to undo the economic and political 
decentralization of post Roman Europe. The goal was vertical integration thus strong 
subnational organizations (town, guilds, etc) had to be swept away.  
Given how integrated guilds were in the medieval town it is not surprising that the state 
had a difficult time curbing their power. Huntington in his 1968 essay makes the point that 
states have difficulty integrating well organized subnational organizations. Migdal in his book 
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Strong Societies and Weak States shows that strong societies can only be brought under control 
of the state when there is massive disruption to their existence. This is backed up by what 
Walker states in his book German Home Towns namely that only when the industrial and 
agricultural revolutions hit central Europe were the guilds weakened enough so that the state 
could integrate them without destroying the state in the process.    
The question of state consolidation/ state building and guilds have a long history. Guilds 
and their role in society are hard to define.  Some scholars view guilds as organizations 
primarily focused on piety, sociability, and solidarity around their trade. Others think that guilds 
were voluntary associations. Still more argue that guilds tried to limit competition but failed. 
For her part Ogilvie in her book The European Guilds an Economic Analysis sees guilds and craft 
guilds in particular as institutions that limited economic advancement for the masses and 
engaged in corrupt relationships with the state. The state found itself dependent on the guilds 
for administrative support and thus was trapped in a less then optimal economic system. What 
is widely understood by most scholars is that guilds were more powerful in areas where 
centralized authority had collapsed, most notably in the Sothern Holy Roman Empire, today 
southern Germany and northern Italy. Walker in his book German Home Towns Community, 
State and General Estate, 1648-1871 notes at length how long guilds managed to hold on to 
real economic and social power in Germany and the long struggle that German state builders 
had trying to take power from guilds and give it to a centralized government lead by the 
absolutist Prussians.  
  Scholars such as Putnam have suggested that institutions such as guilds helped build 
social capital. This social capital he argues makes internal communal bounds stronger and made 
Waldschmidt10 
 
state building easier because of the strong links that the citizens had between themselves, and 
that these links that exist outside of government provided people with the framework to build 
out democracy. Supporting this position is Ashutosh Varshney, who in his book Ethnic Conflict 
and Civic Life (2002) makes the claim that religious violence is less likely in Indian cities with 
more informal links between Hindu and Muslim civic leaders and organizations. We also find 
Putnam in Bowling Alone (2000) distinguishing between bonding and bridging social capital. 
Bonding social capital fosters strong in group ties, while bridging social capital seeks to tie 
different groups together.  
 Scholars such as Ogilvie argued that the social capital generated by strong subnational 
organizations while necessary for the running of small-town institutions, also served to project 
the negative aspects of the organizations such as a near total ban on Jews and women on to the 
whole of society.  She points out that guilds with their stranglehold on the local economy shut 
out anyone not rich or well enough connected to be able to pay for membership of the guild; 
and that guilds were enable to enforce many rules that limited the power of government to 
consolidate its power and that in the long run held the economy back. This concept of social 
capitol can also be applied to Senegal where Marth Wilfahrt in her article Precolonial Legacies 
and Institutional Congruence in Public Goods Delivery: Evidence from Decentralized West Africa 
makes the claim that “… local governments can better coordinate when their formal 
institutional boundaries are congruent with robust social identities” (Wilfahrt 268). That is to 
say that local governments run better when they are working to deliver services within 
boundaries wherein there are strong social identities.           
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Finally, Katzenstein claims in Small States and World Markets that smaller states, with 
strong bounds between citizens, unions, and companies, can more easily reorganize the 
economic life of the country without bringing the state down. He also claims that these states 
have more tools, and the necessary social capital to manage large changes successfully. This 
would seem to strike counter to what is argued by Ogilvie, however there is no contradiction as 
in Katzenstein’s research the state as an institution is well developed and in control, whereas 
Ogilvie is writing about situations where the state is not clearly in control, and where the state 




The question I am researching is did strong guilds hinder the formation of a centralized 
state? And do strong subnational organizations hinder state building today? I will be using the 
history of the guilds in Germany, where they hindered state centralization, England where a 
strong central government kept guilds in check, and religious organizations in Senegal which 
today have great influence on the government.  For the purposes of this project guilds shall 
refer to craft guilds, merchant guilds which were more concerned with the long-haul trade and 
shipment of goods while worthy of study are not the focus of this paper. Craft guilds due to 
their local presence and the fact that their members were more geographical fixed behaved 
differently than the more transient members of merchant guilds.         
As I talk about guilds it is important to note that when I reference strong guilds, I am 
talking about guilds who by virtue of their economic power supplied ancillary services to the 
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government and in return the government would grant them extra privileges. Guilds were not 
strong because they executed what today we would consider public services, but because there 
economic and administrative strength caused them to fulfill this role.  By providing these 
services the guilds had the ablity to control government policy because the government lacked 
the administrative capacity to handle these devolved matters themselves. And the extra 
concessions that strong guilds would receive in return would serve to further enhance their 
control and economic resources.        
 Yet guild strength did not look the same everywhere. In the German speaking lands 
guilds became fare more entrenched then in other European Countries with some guilds 
exercise power up until the unification of Germany. We can see from Ogilvie’s research that the 
guilds of Germany were much more effective at enforcing production bans outside of the towns 
that they were located in. Contrast this with the guilds of England who by and large could not 
enforce such bans. 
Independent Variable 
1. Strong subnational organizations are defined as those that regulate economic and 
social matters for the benefit of members. As a result, state power is visibly affected 
with the result that that laws and or the best interests of the state are ignored.    
2. Weak subnational organizations are those whose power was limited, with the result 
that the state was able to ignore their protests when necessary. Weak subnational 
organizations had less of an ability to force the government to protect there own 
economic and social interests.    
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 Dependent Variable 
State Strength This shall be defined by the government being able to enforce the laws that they 
pass, and for the government to be able to regulate the economy, and societal laws. Things to 
consider the ablity of the state to enforce regular taxation providing for government run public 
services, and for the ablity of the government to standardize laws for the whole country.  
Case Examples The reason I selected these cases is that they represent the different aspects of 
guilds and subnational organizations that I wish to study. The history of the guilds of Germany 
gives us a clear example of strong guilds in the south and weak ones in the northeast. And how 
over time the more centralized Prussian state came to control the weaker governments of the 
south. England shows how the presence of strong centralized government helped to limit its 
dependence of guilds for support and how this helped the country avoid the problems that an 
entrenched guild system generated. Senegal gives a modern example to see how my theory has 
relevance today.          
Guilds in Germany 
In the German speaking lands, there was a sense in which the guilds and the towns 
could be seen to not be beneficial for the implementation of the common good, and that the 
guilds did not care for the general welfare of the state. For if guilds and towns limited economic 
involvement, they weakened the states they were apart of by denying that state the extra 
funds that would have occurred if the guilds had not sought to place limits on economic 
activity. One main exception to this picture of Pre Germany was that of the Prussian State. 
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Prussia had very few strong independent towns and thus was able to consolidate power and 
impose a top down bureaucratic system of state management.  
Guilds in England  
Guilds in England did not function the same way as guilds on the continent. One notable 
example was the guilds lack of ablity to enforce production bans outside of the city that the 
guild was located in. Guilds in London, the economic heart of the country, developed a rule that 
any guild member could function in any trade that had a guild in the city (Ogilvie 117). English 
guilds were also not powerful deep into the country side such as we see in the southern 
Germany. This resulted in or was a much stronger centralized state.  
Modern Day Equivalents in Senegal 
In Senegal there are Sufi religious brotherhoods headed up by marabouts, who had followers 
talibes. These groups helped to reconstruct new communities that were shattered by the 
colonial conquest. These group allowed for advancement of all their members regardless of 
their pervious social class. They formed new villages that transcended pervious kinship 
relations. The Sufi orders acquired large tracts of land. This gave the leader a great deal of 
power to support his members. This economic foundation exists until today, and the support of 
the marabouts can make or break a politician’s career. Next to the state which is in theory 
secular the marabouts are the most powerful institution the country.      






German Guilds In this case study I will analyze the history of German towns and guilds. I 
will argue that the fractured political landscape allowed strong guilds to develop and that these 
guilds fought against state integration. It was only when industrialization was introduced along 
with the Prussian model of government that the state was able to finally curtail guild power and 
strength.  
 The power of guilds in the German lands is not surprising because of the extreme level 
of political disunity and division. After the death of Charlemagne the lands of the East Franks 
(modern Day Germany) would see political power fall to the level of the Duke, this was far more 
centralized then those of the West Franks (modern day France) where power fell down to the 
level of the county. However, the Germany speaking lands were hamstrung by an elective 
monarchy, civil war, and the investiture conflict. Finally, there was the 30 years war which by its 
end in 1648 saw any semblance of political unity destroyed. In the aftermath state central 
authority suffered terribly.  
These political disasters were not the only factor in the weakness of the state in the 
German speaking lands. The condition of the state is subject to many forces all at the same 
time. Admittedly this makes isolating one reason alone as the sole cause of an action difficult if 
not impossible. It is therefore necessary to understand that the following history is not acting in 
a vacuum, rather cycles and self-reinforcing systems are developing. These cycles and systems 
are crafted by, tested, and finally destroyed by history.  
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It is correct to say that the German town had far more power than their counterparts in 
Europe; this was in part due to the condition of Germany and the Holy Roman Empire. As 
Walker explains “The distinctive genius of the Holy Roman Empire was that in practice as well 
as in law, to preserve the powerless [state, town small group etc.] was to defend one’s interests 
and the imperial constitution” (Walker 16). This made direct action against one weaker part of 
the Holy Roman Empire very difficult. A large number of powerful actors existed inside the Holy 
Roman Empire who would threaten to intervene and stop one entity or group from becoming 
too powerful. These conditions allowed the medium sized towns and their respective guilds to 
establish their independence from the countryside that was ruled by the nobility. Once a town 
had a strong tradition of self-governance, states struggled to bring them under their control. 
One main exception to this picture of Germany was that of the Prussian state. Prussia had very 
few strong independent towns and thus it was able to consolidate power and impose a top-
down bureaucratic system of state management. This was in part due to the relatively poor 
lands in the nascent Prussian state, that did not lend themselves to the large wealthy towns of 
the south.  When Germany eventually united under Prussian rule, it was philosophy of top 
down management that would spread over Germany vastly reducing and eliminating any 
special corporate rights that had survived up to that point. Yet it is a testament to the power of 
the guild system that when in the early 1700s Prussia and other states started to pressure town 
guilds to admit more masters who otherwise would not have qualified in other town guilds, 
current guild members, and especially journeymen wanting to become masters, protested and 
even rioted. They thought that if they ended up working for a dishonorable guild or master, 
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they would become tainted and feared they would not be able to become a master in a trade in 
their own towns. 
 The primary purpose for the development of the guilds was economic power. In a world 
that could often be unpredictable and in one in which the social safety net run by the state had 
not yet materialized, towns of all sizes sought to heavily regulate all economic life not only in 
the town, but also in the surrounding areas the town controlled. Trade guilds sought to stop 
ruinous competition by restricting access to the many different trades by forming guild 
monopolies. Guilds provided for their members who had fallen on hard times, and sought to 
provide for the widows and orphans of guild members. Thus to protect themselves guilds 
restricted access to their membership by limiting citizenship in towns. In addition, guilds 
demanded high fees for membership, required lengthy stints as journeymen, instituted 
marriage requirements (preferably to current guild widows, orphaned daughters, or daughters), 
stipulated that no dishonor occur in the family (sexual, legal, etc.) for a specified number of 
generations, and required guild members to completely submit to the guild on all trade 
decisions. 
There were however many benefits of guild membership, chief among them the right to 
practice a trade and have a family. Since membership in a guild was all but necessary to work in 
a town, only guild members would be able to provide for a family. The guilds’ primary focus was 
on the welfare of its members through their economic production and social actions. The 
guilds’ focus very quickly started to clash with state administrations that were more interested 
in maximizing the state’s economic activity than with the welfare of particular guilds. This 
tension between the state’s need to maximize economic activity and the town’s desire to 
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protect its own industries only increased over time and lead to numerous conflicts between 
towns and states, such as the conflict between Flegel the tinsmith and his local community.           
State officials increasingly sought to reform the town structure as the 1700s progressed. 
Important economists such as Johann Justi argued that the guild system was holding the state’s 
economy back by preserving old, less efficient production techniques. “He treated them (towns 
and guilds) as intermediate mechanisms to transmit harmony and order between individuals 
and the common weal, between the generality that was the aggregate of individuals – and the 
generality that was the state” (Walker 169). This view of the town and the guilds would tie local 
citizens to the common good or weal of the state. Thus the state naturally had a role to play in 
making sure that towns and guilds effectively implemented the policies that were in the 
common good, as defined by the state. 
Guild members were tasked with providing many services that today we would consider 
to solely be the job of the state. A good example would be that of firefighting where “In early 
modern Kassel, fire protection responsibilities were allocated to guilds according to technical 
capacities, with smiths providing ladders and fire-hooks, the shoemakers leather buckets and 
hoses, and the building trades axes and pickaxes; eighteenth- century Lippstadt applied a 
similar system” (Ogilvie 62). Guilds members were also tasked in other cities with regulating 
their own trades by searching for counterfeit goods, or for goods that were being imported 
above quota limits. Sometimes guilds were tasked with administrating systems that were not 
logically within their sphere of expertise. Take for example the sausage makers guild of 
Augsburg who held the office of the jailer for the town (Ogilvie 61). This situation points 
towards governments that by today’s standards were so weak that they needed to subcontract 
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out this work. In fact, governments were so keen to weaken the power of the nobility and the 
clergy that guilds becoming stronger was often seen as a benefit to state power because guilds 
were an entity that could be played off against the nobility and clergy by the central 
government. 
As is often the case, academics began arguing for change before concrete efforts were 
realized in real life. Johann Justi who, on economic policy was in favor of the individual and 
though the goal of the state should be to remove obstacles of human ambition, did not approve 
of the guilds when they limited economic activity. There was a sense in which the guilds and the 
towns could be seen as not beneficial for the implementation of the common good, and that 
the guild did not care for the general welfare of the state. For if guilds and towns limited 
economic involvement, they weakened the states by denying the state the extra funds that 
would have occurred if the guilds had not sought to place limits on economic activity. 
While academics debated the proper role of state, town, and guild, Prussia was 
expanding and consolidating. Prussian state consolidation was fairly successful in lands they 
had controlled for many decades. However, when Prussia began to incorporate lands seized 
from Austria and others, lands that had within them strong towns, the Prussians soon ran into 
trouble. Prussian administrators sought to equally enforce laws on all those whom it applied. 
This practice, however, ran directly counter to the whole concept of corporate rights, which do 
not seek equal enforcement of common laws, but rather addresses each group differently, and 
grants to each group a different set of rights and privileges.  
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When Prussia enacted reforms, it tried to enact them everywhere. Prussians quickly 
found that the stronger towns they had incorporated into their territorial holdings were 
resisting its reforms by trying to bend the new Prussian laws to fit the complex long-established 
local customs. When the Prussian government attempted to reconcile local law with their new 
state objectives, they inevitably found themselves in the position of relying on local town 
citizens to help implement and meld the new laws with the complex existing customs. These 
local citizens, however, wanted to accomplish the exact opposite of what many of the new laws 
were proposing. 
The height of this bureaucratic assault on the towns and guilds came during the time of 
Napoleon. Napoleon brought the French practice of centralized administration, and with the 
power of the French Army, the French sought to reform Germany so as to make governing 
there easier. The French state sought to exact as much money, recruits, and resources as 
possible from the subservient German states. However, the towns and other corporate entities 
fought this power and the new legal codes based on Napoleonic law, by relying on the legal 
system and the limits of administration. For example, in the Westphalian state, which in trying 
to impose central state control over local budgets, ran into serious problems when it required 
“every community budget to pass from locality to sub prefect to Interior Ministry, to State 
Council, with endorsement at every stage and local budget got legal validity only by royal 
decree” (Walker 211The State of Westphalia was buried by the ensuing mountain of paperwork 
and eventual decided that the fight was not winnable. With the fall of Napoleon what progress 
had been made toward greater centralization was reversed. This episode shows that the 
hometowns would not be crushed and integrated forcefully, much less at the behest of a 
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foreign power. What these events accomplished was to draw the battle lines and preview the 
tactics that towns, guilds, and states would use after Napoleon was defeated.         
Following the downfall of Napoleon and a brief resurgence of self-governance during 
the early 1810s, the towns and guilds once again began to slowly lose power in their contest 
with the state as the 19th century progressed. The reasons for the gradual erosion of their 
special status required circumstances in Germany to change. Industrialization and technological 
changes revealed how inflexible the guilds were. Also, these new industries provided another 
source of economic power that was largely outside the control of the towns. Therefore, states 
were not as dependent on towns for their revenues. Population expansion placed greater 
pressure on towns to admit more citizens as more and more Germans found themselves 
without citizenship in a town or community. Before journeymen rioted to protect the honor of 
the guilds they one day wished to join; now journeymen started demanding guild reforms to 
make access to the trades easier. Bureaucracy also changed its tactics. Previously, the state had 
attempted to micromanage the guilds and local communities by telling them what to do; the 
state now simply began regulating guilds and communities by implementing laws prohibiting 
certain behaviors, customs, and actions. Eventually, states found themselves with enough 
power to start demanding real changes. This came from the industrial revolution providing a 
new economic base outside of the town guild system. This resulted in laws such as the 1867 
Confederation Law on free movement that prohibited “all special laws and privilege of 
particular places and districts which permit restrictions on residents” (Walker 416). This law 
severely limited the power towns had because now it was now illegal to bar new residents from 
joining a town. 
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The final nail in the coffin for strong rights for local towns and guilds was the formation 
of the second German Empire under Prussia, which exerted its long history of centralized state 
power on the whole of Germany. This is not to say that the Prussians or German government 
stopped the people of the towns from viewing themselves as a separate class. As unique 
groups, that was never the point of the conflict. The formation of the German state was not an 
attempt to make every German the same, but to have uniform laws, regulations, and 
administration irrespective of which group of Germans it was being applied to. By having these 
uniform laws and regulations, necessary components of the modern nation sate, Germany had 
to crush the special rights and privileges of the different corporate groups inside the country. 
Previously, these corporate groups retained their power by being exceptions to the rule; in this 
sense they were diametrically opposed to a strong nation state with central governance. 
English Guilds In this case study I will argue that English history produced a system of 
government that preempted to a certain degree strong guilds. Thus, the self-reinforcing cycles 
of guild power that we witnessed in the German speaking lands did not develop as robustly. 
This combined with early industrialization resulted in the guilds losing what power they had 
earlier.     
The situation in England differed from that of the German speaking lands. Notable 
features of the German guild system such as rural production bans outside of towns did not 
exist. Guilds could only function inside their selected towns. The guilds in England also had 
other features not found in the much stricter central European Environment. For example, 
guilds in England did not have the system of forcing their competitors in the countryside to 
form guilds as well. Finally, in London it was possible for a man for buy admittance into one 
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guild, and then be able to practice the trade or profession of any other guild in the city (Ogilvie 
117). This state of affairs was almost unheard of outside of England. This shows the degree to 
which the English Government was able to control its own affairs without having to subcontract 
out to guilds. The reason for this governmental strength can be found in English history.  
Following the invasion of 1066, we can already see the administrative capacity of the 
new Norman rulers in the Doomsday Book. This survey started the process of increasing the 
taxation capacities of the state. It is interesting to note that even from this time we can see one 
major exception to state consolidation, that of the city of London, who accepted William as king 
so long as he recognized their rights and traditions. Therefore, it is not surprising that London 
would be home to the strongest guilds in England.  
The 100 Years War saw the English engage in a series of wars with France. England had 
less land, and resources than the French but kept them off balance with different invasion 
points and hit and run tactics, however it was impossible to completely knock France out of the 
conflict. One result of this conflict was the introduction of regular taxation on the populace; this 
gave way to the monies necessary to have a standing army. The English had to balance these 
increases in taxation with the role of Parliament. Parliament had to approve taxes to go to war, 
even to this day in the U.K. the only piece of legislation that Parliament must pass is the army 
bill. While the English Civil War was very damaging to the country it did not result in the same 
level of political fragmentation that was experienced on the continent, especially in Germany.  
By limiting political fragmentation, the English state did not find itself locked into as 
strongly the self-enforcing economic political cycles found on the continent. “In western Europe 
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the ‘‘exceptional’’ development of guilds in England is a case in point: there they did not 
acquire the strong position held by guilds in continental Europe, but that was largely because of 
the strength of English government and the resulting reduced independence of English cities 
within its commonwealth” (Lucassen, Jan et al 13-14).  It is also the case that the industrial 
revolution began in England, thus starting earlier the process of disrupting the traditional 
economic system that the guilds relied on for their power base.   
Let us consider the example of the London Weavers Company, a textile guild that later 
transitioned into a livery company, and today primarily acts as a charity. First, it is important 
that this guild was located in London where by all academic accounts guild power was the 
strongest in England. Here in a history of the guild we here that “By the middle of the 
eighteenth century the Weavers, while holding in theory to their rights, privileges and 
ordinances (and taking sporadic action, from time to time, as though to prove it), were 
apparently well aware that conformity to their regulation on any substantial scale could be 
neither induced nor enforced” (Plummer 354). The middle of the eighteenth century, 1750s is 
well before 1860s where the soon to be unified Germany was still passing laws seeking to curb 
the power of the guilds. The Weavers were eventually forced to change there ways as their 
business model was assaulted by the realties of cheaper foreign imports, and the introduction 
of new production methods such as the power loom that were being implemented in the new 
industrial centers of England that were outside of London and out of reach of guild regulation; 
though it is doubtful if such regulations could have been enforced even if given the opportunity 
to have done so. Consistent themes of the guild’s history were strong violent opposition to 
technological progress, immigration of skilled craftsmen, and foreign competition. 
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 Foreign competition could be stemmed though protective trade barriers though the 
long-term stability of these tariffs was often in doubt and often open to abuse by smugglers. 
However, nothing could be done about the rise of new domestic competition. These new 
competitors to the traditional production methods of old London took advantage of the 
industrial revolution and the geographic advantages of running industrial operations outside of 
London. For these new industries needed vast amounts of fuel (coal) to run, fuel that was 
expensive to transport down to London this combined with cheaper building space for factories 
also expedited the removal of industry from London toward the northern counties. Vast 
investment in the domestic rail then allowed these producers to be able to economically move 
there wears from the factory to markets either in Britain or to British Ports for export.  
Economic conditions for the Weavers were so desperate that by 1855 one 
recommendation from the Survey Committee read “On the other hand, the committee felt sure 
that every member of the Company and the Court would regret that the oldest Gild… of London 
should lose the respectability which attaches to having their own Hall. (Plummer 385). The guild 
hall was the base of operations of a guild and an outward symbol of there wealth and power. 
To be at risk of losing one was an outward symbol of how far the Weavers guild had fallen.   
 This example of the decline of the Weavers guild encapsulates the history of the guilds 
of England in that there fall befell them sooner than their counterparts on the continent, and in 
how it was not until the economic conditions substantially changed that the guilds power was 
fatally weakened. Yet it was through the weakening of the guilds that England would 
experience the true benefit of the industrial revolution, the economic paradigm shifted from 
one that limited technological progress and favored low production rates and high margins to 
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one of mass production and low margins. This pattern is likewise seen on the continent though 
well delayed by the later adoption of the industrial revolution and weak central governing 
authorities.                
Senegal: In this case study I will argue that Sufi religious brotherhoods have been hurting state 
power in some similar ways like the guilds. I will point out that they are using their economic 
and social power to stop progressive societal reforms.                    
In Senegal there has existed for many years religious Sufi brotherhoods. These groups 
are led by Sufi religious men called marabouts and played a key part in rebuilding society after 
the colonial conquest by the French. “While traditional patterns of solidarity based on kinship 
and community identify persisted, these forms of solidarity often became secondary to 
solidarity with one’s marabout and fellow congregants…” (Gellar 110). Followers of a marabout 
would work for 10 years on his land and then in return would receive land of their own and 
create communities that were loyal to the marabout. The marabout would also work to provide 
economic support to his followers when hard times arose.  As a result, a great deal of land and 
economic resources came under the control of these organizations, and these organizations 
found themselves close to political power. “By the time of World War II the French authorities 
and the leaders of the Sufi brotherhoods were locked in partnership. Sufi leaders collaborated 
closely with colonial governors and instructed their disciples to accept colonial rule, pay taxes, 
cultivate groundnuts, and submit to forced labor and military conscription” (Boone 56). In 
return the marabouts were given cash infusions and agricultural support. These organizations 
were used to help organize economic activity and were some of the loudest voices arguing for 
the liberalization of the state economy. The marabouts became glue that helped to hold society 
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together and this sense of unity spread to the political realm as well. Consider the following 
statement from a Senegalese farmer from the village of Darou Lo “… That is to say, our 
marabout Cheikh Lo gave birth to demokaraasi [democracy] here in Darou Lo. Any villager is as 
much a child of the Cheikh Lo as the marabout’s own natural child. Today we sit on the same 
bed. We eat the same food. The marabout Cheikh Lo teaches us the same thing. We have the 
same desires. The same things are prohibited to us both. Here, whatever we do, we do it 
together” (Schaffer 64). For many the local marabout represents democracy and a vital piece of 
village government. This should not come as a surprise because after the French invasion, the 
French used the marabouts as conduits by which to regulate rural Senegal.        
 Yet conflict with the state was inevitable. Consider the conflict of the Family Code of 
1972. It banned polygamy, demanded equal inheritances for sons and daughters, and 
liberalized divorce. The Sufi Brotherhoods rejected the law with the result being its 
enforcement in urban areas and being ignored in rural ones. Their power politically has seen 
Senegalese Politicians appeal more to Islam and contributed to Islam taking a more prominent 
place in public life. Sufi Brotherhoods vie for power with politicians and use their influence to 
push for Islamic values to be taught in state schools and for the advancement of Islam in the 
Public discourse. 
The problems of enforcing the law was also seen when “In January 1999, a law was 
passed that made domestic violence punishable by a jail sentence and monetary fines but, as 
one judge noted, some families pressure judges to minimize penalties and the economic 
position of other families limitswhat they are able to pay in the first place.” (Lust 165-166).” The 
position of Senegal in general is that the laws are based on secular principles however older 
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practices based on culture and religion continue the be the law that is de facto enforced in the 
countryside, and by many Senegalese personally.  
These brotherhoods have also used their power to force their students to beg in 
exchange for a religious education. "If you do the math, you'll find that these people are 
earning more than a government functionary," said Souleymane Bachir Diagne, an Islamic 
scholar at Columbia University. "It's why the phenomenon is so hard to eradicate." (Nossiter). 
Consider that in 2010 a court Senegalese court passed a ruling that forbids the practice of 
turning children out to beg for money, and yet the practice still remains common unto this day. 
The lack of educational infrastructure in the interior of the country makes the allure of “free” 
education very appealing to poor parents. The economic and political power of the marabouts 
has like the guilds limited the power of the state to determine the economic and social fate the 
country.  
Given how important these religious institutions are to both Senegalese politicians for 
political support, and to Senegalese society has a whole it seems unlikely that the state will 
supplant the role that the marabouts play in society. What is clear is that like with the guilds it 
will be hard to impossible to change social realities by administrative fiat. The underlying 
conditions that built the power of the marabouts must be weakened either by the actions of 
government or by other changes. Until that point, the marabouts like the guilds, will there use 
their power to perpetrate cycles of patronage and support to reinforce the current system. 
Also, it will take a welling up of support from the local populace that the system needs to 
change, to give politicians the political capital necessary to make structural reforms to the 





Hypothesis: That strong subnational organizations in a country weaken the power of the state.  
Findings: Through the case examples of Germany, England and Senegal we can see that strong 
subnational organizations prevent state consolidation. That the stronger these groups are the 
harder it is for the state to impose its will on matters that the group does not want them to. We 
see that the modern nation state as understood in the industrialized West would not be able to 
function if these subnational organizations still had their old levels of power. These 
organizations were disrupted by new technology, had had their roles as agents of the state 
taken over by the state itself, and saw there roles as social institutions taken over by state 
welfare programs, universal citizenship, and expanded enfranchisement. Strong subnational 
organizations still exist in many countries today and as we can see in Senegal can prevent the 
government from enforcing universal laws and are a competing institution to the government 
that has to be considered when making laws.   
 That being said, while it is true that strong subnational organizations have played a 
measurable role in preventing state consolidation, they are not the only factor. As my research 
has shown the historical environment is critical for the development of the state as well. I have 
found through my research that the historical situation often stretching back hundreds of years 
has profound implications on how the state developed. Historical forces also shaped the strong 
subnational organizations that I have been researching, and these forces will continue to affect 
state consolidation today. The key point is that these strong subnational ordinations became 
apart of the historical forces affecting the state, setting up cycles of power and governance that 
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lasted for a long time. And it is these self-reinforcing cycles of power that hampered state 
growth and consolidation by limiting state power.           
Application: My research has shown that control of capitol is the source of power for the 
running of institutions. And that for the formation of strong nation states, inefficient and local 
control of capitol must be broken up for the state to take a larger role and for economic 
expansion to increase at the pace necessary to keep increased populations employed, 
government coffers full, and the army funded As the history of the guilds of Germany and 
England showed us it is not possible to change these structures unless the foundations upon 
which they rest are majorly disrupted. To try and do otherwise is to risk the viability of the 
state. As we have seen in Senegal the marabouts economic power, has been coupled with 
political power to the point that it will take a massive disruption to their power base to dislodge 
them from power. If subnational organizations are powerful enough to resist state attempts at 
control, then the state must wait until economic conditions have changed in such a way as to 
undermine the organizations. To try and take action earlier could risk bringing the state down in 
the process.  
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